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ABSTRACT. A discussion of the imposition of the interests of the few on the
collective through a subtle but effective manner: the eventual, complete
development of Massive Open Online Courses. It is this article’s premise that this
development together with current marketing efficacy and the present economic
goals of modern democracies, is probable to result in a shrinkage of the market
place of ideas and, paradoxically, likely to result in a diminution of democracy in
the world.
Keywords: MOOCs, Massive Open Online Classes, Democracy, Tyranny of the
Majority, Marketing, Conformity

1. Introduction: Society’s Desire for Independence
The preservation of the individual’s unalienable rights and the supply of
the security usurped by the mighty of a state of nature (hereinafter referred
to as ‘Private Status’), are the primary objectives of a benign power
arrangement. The active and perpetual balancing of these two goals is the
pursuit of a just state. The people of democratic states established such
aims when they voluntarily conferred their sovereignty to the institutions of
government (hereinafter referred to as ‘Public Status’). Such transfer of
power was and remains a manifestation of the people’s desire to progress
towards a virtuous state.
As reflected by the U.S. Constitution, this grand movement is taken
with extreme prudence. First and foremost, the people wish to be secure
from an eventual degenerate form of their very own creation. After all, the
interests of those in power at the time of this progress are historically
imposed upon the collective. Consequently, power is transferred to Public
Status with the stipulation that the individual’s natural rights be infringed
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only by adequate necessity. But, while the people’s pursuit of happiness
begins with protection of the people’s natural rights from their very own
institutions, the raison d’être of Public Status is to provide a framework
within which civil rights, political rights and social rights may be ordained
so to allow the pursuit. Private Status and the imposition of its interests
upon the collective, then, remains the true antagonist of the aforementioned
progress.
However, in many matters of modern society the democratization of the
state of nature has been left to the same underpinnings on which Private
Status rested in a state of nature, the workings of a laissez fair based
system. Ironically, the institutionalization and legitimization of such
‘workings’ by Public Status has, in fact, created an unprecedented
framework of economic opportunity. Like in a state of nature, however,
such opportunities are rarely relevant to or exploitable by anyone other
than Private Status.
Current levels of disparity of exploitability have, ostensibly, reached
intolerable levels for an organic society. In the movement from a state of
nature to a state of virtue, Public Status has left scarcely attended the
governance of several key economic and social issues. Orphans of
legislation, most citizens have been left with general dissatisfaction and a
desire for retribution.
More specific to this paper is a discussion of the continuation of the
imposition of the interests of Private Status on the collective by a subtler
but effective manner: The eventual, complete development of Massive
Open Online Courses (‘MOOCs’). It is this article’s premise that this
development, together with current marketing efficacy and the present
economic goals of Public Status, is, paradoxically, likely to result in a
diminution of democracy in the world.
2. What Are MOOCs?
MOOCs1 are an extremely sophisticated form of distance learning
(generally, at the undergraduate and graduate levels of education) (Fini
2009). High quality video and audio stream to computer equipped students,
simultaneously, artificial intelligence tools allow for instructor to student
and student to student interaction, virtual laboratories and the submission
and analysis of exam material (Daniel 2012). Institutions, including those
generally considered to be elite, have requested their best professors to
teach such courses.
MOOCs are offered gratuitously or at heavily discounted prices.
Regardless of the gratuity element, generally, the fixed costs of production
remain the same whether the classes are offered to one student or to ten
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million students. Consequently, the student cost of such courses (or
degrees) is considerably less than conventional courses (or degrees); a
seemingly good thing (Onink 2013).2 Simultaneously, the economies of
scale make the proposition of MOOCs very lucrative to the institutions,
another ostensibly good thing. In fact, it may be argued that the recent
advent and importance placed on MOOCs stems from the need of
institutions to raise funds (Vardi 2012).3
Regardless of the reasons for their recent popularity, MOOCs are
expected to grow (Lohr 2013) rapidly and lead to the education of millions
of students around the world (Cohan 2012). The American Council on
Education has moved quickly to certify some of the courses as creditworthy. Many other colleges are considering plans to award credit for
MOOCs (Jaschik 2013).
Coursera, the current leader in the new, online education industry, “has
grown at warp speed to emerge as striving to support its business by
creating revenue streams through licensing, certification fees and
recruitment data provided to employers, among other efforts” (Lewin
2013). Four months after Coursera became operative; its free college
courses had drawn in a million users “a faster launching than either
Facebook or Twitter” (Lewin 2013). The co-founders of Coursera,
computer science professors at Stanford University, witnessed enrollment
pass two million, with 70,000 new students a week signing up for over 200
courses …taught by faculty members at the company’s partners, 33 elite
universities. In less than a year, Coursera has attracted $22 million in
venture capital Universities nationwide are increasing their online
offerings, hoping to attract students around the world. Harvard and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology have each provided $30 million to
create edX (Lewin 2013). Another Stanford spinoff, Udacity, has attracted
more than a million students to its menu of massive open online courses, or
MOOCs, along with $15 million in financing (Lewin 2013).
3. The Inherent Dangers of MOOCs
Given the massive potential for institutional profitability and the
simultaneous benefit of lower costs to the student, the MOOCs movement
is, ostensibly, inexorable. Inevitably, market forces are likely to continue to
lead the elite institutions to be frontrunners in this market and to eventually
offer students degrees at heavily discounted prices (Cusumano 2013). At a
glance, these outcomes are irrefutable benefits which ought to and
currently seem to be welcomed by both the student and the institution.
A long-run assessment, however, sheds light on a problematic,
prospective consequence. If the presently praised economies of scale allow
49

a student to attend an elite university at an extremely reduced cost, who
will attend a lesser institution? Arguably, ceteris paribus, if the cost is
similar, students are less likely to choose a less reputable institution over a
more prestigious one; a construct applicable to millions of students seeking
what seems to be the better education. Accordingly, considering that (1) the
elite institutions are very few, (2) the number of the ‘best and brightest’ of
each institutions is extremely limited, and (3) the potential world-wide
students is in the millions, the paradigm become perilous: unintended, selfimposed, standardized higher education at a world-wide level. It is not
unreasonably foreseeable that the popularity of MOOCs will increase to a
point where a great majority of students (world-wide) will enroll in at least
one transferable course or graduate from one of very few Ivy League
universities offering MOOCs based degrees; leaving on the sidelines the
less recognized institutions (Cusumano 2013). Either way, the result leaves
few, elite educators to formulate and proliferate judgments for and to the
masses (regarding a topic or a whole degree).
Accordingly, in the near future a great majority of the workforce will
have graduated from a handful of universities; having read the same texts,
performed on the same exams, heeded to the same professor(s), learned the
same substance, and even perceived the same eccentricities of those few
professor(s). While, arguably, at the micro level, the single student may
receive a good education, the macro outlook suggests a disconcerting
result: physicians, journalists, lawyers, political animals, all with the same
thoughts, i.e., tyranny of the majority to a greater degree than historically
contemplated. In light of this universal conformity, even Plato’s
philosopher-kings would generate a mob of citizens which would make the
aforementioned democratic progress halt.
When one sees millions of people thinking the same thoughts and
reading the same books, and perceives that as the multitude grows, its
influence becomes always stronger, it is hard to imagine how new points of
repulsion and contrast are to arise, new diversities of sentiment and
doctrine to be developed (Bryce 1995).
Such level of control (Rampini 2013) on the collective is the antithesis
of democratic thought. In fact, even if the handful of professors were to
preach freedom of thought, without an opposing argument, the prayer will
be stale and moot.4 And, of course, the perils escalate if the philosopherkings degenerate into demagogues and actually espouse views contrary to
freedom of thought.
Although MOOCs is not state action,5 the underpinnings of the
rationale for freedom of speech rights apply to the present discussion. To
borrow from doctrines of U.S. constitutional law, freedom of speech is
intended to create a market place of ideas: ‘[W]hen men have realized that
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time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution” (Abrams 1919). Simply put, generally, speech is protected
only if any potential harms which may flow from it can be prevented
(rebutted) by other speech (and not by force); “[i]t is not acceptable to
uphold the right to use speech as a sword where no exchange of views is
involved” (Tribe 1942).
A competing idea must exist to test the validity of a premise. MOOCs
will eliminate the counter positioning which allows for freedom of speech
protection; they will turn the market economy of ideas into a planned
economy of ideas.
The constitutional right of free expression is…designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting
the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each
of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more
capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other
approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice
upon which our political system rests (Cohen 1971).
The margin of utility of the millionth class of the same lecture is not an
“essential part of any exposition of ideas, and [will be] of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality”
(Chaplinsky 1942).
The conformity created by MOOCs will percolate into the governance
of democracies; what fosters democracy if not dialogue between competing
sides? In the end, it is grossly paradoxical that the apparent democratization
of education will adversely impact the democratic progress mentioned in
the introduction; “[t]o be afraid of ideas.., is to be unfit for selfgovernment” (Meiklejohn 1948).
‘[T]he First Amendment... has a structural role to play in securing and
fostering our republican system of self-government … Implicit in this
structural role is not only the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,’ … but also the antecedent
assumption that valuable public debate-as well as other civic behavior-must
be informed. The structural model links the First Amendment to that
process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus
entails solicitude not only for communication itself, but for the
indispensable conditions of meaningful communication (Richmond 1980).
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De Tocqueville observed how the tyranny of the majority inhibits the
freedom of thought, “[the] invisible and subtle power that mocks all the
efforts of tyranny.” (De Tocqueville 1956) Almost two-hundred years later,
MOOCs render his proposition regarding such tyranny much more likely
(even though, ironically, originating at the other end of the spectrum, a
tyranny of the oligarchy). The ‘invisible and subtle power’ is greatly
curtailed by MOOCs, leaving the opening for the tyranny.
The marketplace of ideas is what provides the democratic government
the pool of information necessary to choose policy. If MOOCs grow as
predicted, what antitrust guardians will protect the consumers of ideas in
absence of opposing ideas? What legislation can prevent the restraint on
freedom of ideas if only one idea exists? In absence of a market of ideas,
that which is preached from a very small group of persons will seldom be
questioned.
A democratic curriculum emphasizes access to a wide range of
information and the right of those of varied opinion to have their
viewpoints heard. Educators in a democratic society have an obligation to
help young people seek out a range of ideas and to voice their own.
Unfortunately, many schools persistently shirk this obligation in several
ways. First, they narrow the range of school-sponsored knowledge to what
we might call ‘official’ or high-status knowledge that is produced or
endorsed by the dominant culture. Second, they silence the voices of those
outside the dominant culture (Apple and Beane 1995).
4. Intensifying the Inherent Dangers of MOOCs:
The Goals of Public Status
The apparent objective of Public Status is no longer the pursuit of a just
state, as described in the introduction. In extrapolating the causality of
current government policy, we find that modern Public Status is concerned
primarily with aggregate productivity rather than the virtuous citizen.6
“The science of politics…seeks an accurate description and
classification of political institutions and a precise determination of the
forces which create and control them” (Gettell 1945). However, presently,
comprehension of these ‘forces’ has become a purely economic matter.
Political authority has come to define ‘general welfare’ solely as an
economic term; accordingly, today’s state allocates much of its efforts to
attaining economic goals: full employment, price stability, growth and
income distribution.
While political economics is a relatively young discipline (“economics
is certainly not much more than two-hundred years old and as a profession
bout 150 years old” [Uphoff and Warren 1972] the national expression has
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become little more than an economic figure. Public Status has left
governance to what periodically appears to generate the greatest numbers
in the economic metric mentioned above, that is, Private Status. Thus, the
macro-economic perspective has become the full time agenda of today’s
political authority.
Currently, the disconnect between the original objective of Public
Status (i.e., the virtuous citizen) and modern economic objectives is
epitomized by the divide between the voter and the technocratic
governments. That is, the personal sovereignty offered by a democratic
power structure is at odds with purely ‘economic leaders.’ For example,
arguably, the frustration of the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement is its
inability to understand the nomenclature and workings of present Public
Status and its Private Status support structure (e.g., what is a derivative?
How did it lead to a recession?). If these concepts constitute the clay of
modern society, leaders cannot be elected by virtuous citizens, instead
technocrats most be appointed. Such a nebulous movement (and similar
ones, e.g., No-Global) is a reflection of the citizen’s loss of reference in
light of incomprehensible government goals. Consequently, this general
will is leaderless and inarticulate. Seemingly, its goal is to merely create a
presence rather than to propose solutions (it cannot know what to propose).
In the end, the citizen’s sovereignty and voice in government has slowly
been usurped by the technicality of the economy, and more increasingly
replaced with the purchasing election of a consumer.
Given the nature of these macroeconomic goals (in a Constantine like
manner) it is in Public Status’ interest to support and promote the
development of MOOCs as its new religion. MOOCs, as stated above, are
likely to wither away the dialogue, diversity and dissent, and replace the
discontent with somnambulist disciples. A curtailment of the disgruntled
makes governing more linear, consequently, facilitating the attainment of
the aforementioned economic goals of the modern state. Nietzsche makes
the following observation: “The governments of the great States have two
instruments for keeping the people dependent, in fear and obedience: a
coarser, the army, and a more refined, the school” (Levy 1974).
This environment, as created by modern Public Status goals, increases
the likelihood of the survival of only a few, elite institutions in the
aftermath of the predicted growth of MOOCs, in turn, increasing the
likelihood of a handful of professor instructing the millions.
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5. Intensifying the Inherent Dangers of MOOCs:
Marketing and the Demand of the Modern Individual
As suggested above, the citizen’s political sovereignty is being replaced
with the consumer’s economic autonomy. While this economic freedom is
desirable, consumer demand comes from an innate motivation for selfpreservation, which is perpetually in need of satisfaction. This acquisitive
nature leaves the consumer forever wanting. Accordingly, as the consumer
ventures out to fulfill his unattainable goals he becomes the easy prey of
marketing efforts. In part, marketing is the art of deluding the consumer
into trusting that unattainable goals are, in fact, achievable.7 Ownership and
consumption hence become illusionary ends; products and services become
substitutes used to mislead consumers into trusting that these were, in fact,
their original objectives. Coupled with the quest for equality embedded in
democracies, marketing instills in present-day consumers the misconceived
pursuit to own or be anything.
As democracy postulates equality, it puts everyone in a race towards the
same. Undoubtedly, ownership and the market pricing system are an
extension of one’s freedom (Locke 1689) but can the individual consumer
(who votes for production of goods) see the whole truth?8 That is, does the
consumer have the ability to see through the guile of marketing and discern
what to buy and what to be?
Marketing’s ability to amplify humans’ innate acquisitive nature and
render all aspirations seemingly attainable creates a tyranny of the majority
unimagined by De Tocqueville; everyone is salivating to belong to the next
group or to purchase the new, new, new thing. Without digressing too
much into concepts of the dictatorship of marketing, it seems that while art
used to be a reflection of society, today, society is a reflection of
marketing. The marketing of MOOCs to the millions will be the epitome of
this irrational condition.
MOOCs’ entry into this marketing and economic logic9 is nonsensical
and dangerous. Inevitably, in the hands of marketing oracles, the few elite
institutions will impress upon potential students that (like the latest
generation cell phone), if they desire an elite education, they should have it.
MOOCs entry into the market represents a collision between the
materialistic world and the world of reason; Plato’s philosopher kings
moving into the sphere of appetite, and vice versa. All with the help of
marketing telling millions of potential students that which is contrary to
nature: that they can all see the light.
This logic increases the likelihood that in the aftermath of the predicted
growth of MOOCs, few elite institutions will be left standing, therefore
increasing the likelihood of a handful of professor instructing the millions.
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6. Conclusion
Democratic institutions are a manifestation of the people’s desire to
progress towards a state where the ideas of the few are not imposed on the
whole. The survival of democratic institutions relies on an open flow of
diverse ideas and the critical analysis of the same. Critical thinking at its
elemental level requires validation and refinement of a premise by the
scrutiny of competing ideas.
In absence of this conversation, that which is spewed from an elite
group of persons will seldom be prodded and probed. Such control of the
few over the collective is the antithesis of democratic thought. Presently, it
can only be found in one place, religious dogma. Are Gods presently
among men? If not, the imposition of the interests of the few (including
Public Status) on the collective is assured by the intoxicating combination
of (1) the economic interests of Public Status, (2) consumer’s insatiable and
irrational appetite for everything, (3) the marketing of the untrue idea that
we can and should, in fact, have/be anything and (4) MOOCs.
In the end, the foregoing arguments are self-substantiating, an
attestation of the very perils they preach against; that is, in absence of
dissenting opinions, they may be, disturbingly, left to stand.
NOTES
1. While the term MOOCs typically refers to single courses, in this article, the
term is used to refer to single course offerings, multiple course offerings, and full
degree offerings.
2. “Right now, for the unbeatable price of $0, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology professor Anant Agarwal is teaching a class on circuits and electronics
to thousands of people online – no MIT application required. Harvard, Princeton,
Michigan, and other top schools have also started open courses for everyone”
(Clark 2013).
3. “The Great recession reduced the private institution’s endowments, reduced
state support of public institutions and, most importantly, given the job market,
made students question the value of higher education. Arguably, ‘the enormous
buzz about MOOCs is not due to the technology's intrinsic educational value, but
due to the seductive possibilities of lower costs” (Vardi 2012).
4. A topical example of the might of the intellectuals and their uncontrolled
reputation is offered by the recently disproved economic theories of Harvard
professors, Reinhart and Rogoff. Leaders of several countries predicated their
policies on these economists’ findings (Gods among men?), which were eventually
disproven by a student, Thomas Herndon, from a non-ivy league university.
Arguably, a Thomas Herndon is less likely to exist in a MOOCs infested world,
where a handful of professors hold the reign to knowledge (Krugman 2013).
5. But is it coming? (Gardner and Young 2013).
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6. The Karl Marx’s ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ argument?
7. This note is no manner hoping to suggest that the discipline of marketing is
exclusively devoted to this end. Naturally, this discipline has brought society
innumerable benefits, which are beyond of the scope of this note.
8. Arguably, however, recently society and marketing are in better unison
(Arvidisson and Giordano 2013).
9. “It is not for the economist [or marketer], but the moralist and the
philosopher to decide what kind of society we should deem desirable. An industrial
society has one thing in abundance, and that is material welfare more than is good
for it. If to uphold justice and freedom to restore meaning and unity in life, we
should ever be called upon to sacrifice some efficiency in production, economy in
consumption, or rationality of administration, an industrial civilization can afford it.
The economic historians’ message to philosophers today should be: we can afford
to be both just and free” (Polanyi 2013).
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